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SECURITIES LAW

Does SEC Rule 1O-b5 Provide an Implied Private
Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud?
by Matthew J. Barrett

Central Bank of Denver, N.A.
V.

First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
and Jack K. Naber
(Docket No. 92-854)

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Argument Date: November 30, 1993
From: The Tenth Circuit

ISSUES
1. Do Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 provide an implied private
right of action for aiding and abetting violations of those proSection 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
visions?
U.S.C. 78j(b) ("Section 10(b)"), and
2. If so, does recklessness satisfy the
Securities and Exchange Commission
mental-state requirement for aiding
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5
and abetting Section 10(b) and
("Rule lOb-5"), prohibit securities
Rule lob-5 violations when the
fraud. Section 10(b) provides:
7
his case co ncems the civil liabilialleged aider and abettor has not
It shall be unlawful for any
ty of pers )ns who aid and abet
breached a duty to disclose or to
person, directly or indirectly, by
T
securities fraud in violation of
act?
the use of any means or instrufederal law. Firs t, the Supreme Court
mentality of interstate comwill decide if feder al securities law recogFACTS
In 1988, Central Bank of Denver,
merce or of the mails, or any
nizes an implied private right of action
facility of any national securities
against those who aid and abet securities
N.A. ("Central") served as bond
trustee when the Colorado Springsexchangefraud. Second, ii the Court concludes
(b) To use or employ, in conthat there is a priv ate right of action, it is
Stetson Hills Public Building
nection with the purchase or sale
asked to decide if recklessness satisfies
Authority (the "Authority") sold $11
of any security registered on a
million in tax-exempt municipal
the mental-state re quirement which lower
national securities exchange or
courts have held is a prerequisite for
bonds to finance public improvements
any security not so registered,
imposing civil liab ility.
in a planned residential and commerany manipulative or deceptive
cial community in Colorado Springs
device or contrivance in contracalled Stetson Hills. The Authority
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
pledged land in the development to secure the bonds and agreed
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
that the collateral would at all times have an appraised value at
least equal to 160 percent of the bonds' outstanding principal
interest or for the protection of investors.
and interest. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ("First
Rule lob-5 provides:
Interstate") purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, later selling
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
some of the bonds to various customers, including Jack K.
Naber.
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any nationCentral previously served as trustee for a 1986 issuance of
al securities exchange,
similar bonds. Before the 1988 bonds were issued, Central
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
received an updated appraisal covering both the land securing
defraud,
the 1986 bonds and the separate parcels which the Authority
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
proposed
as security for the 1988 bonds.
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
The updated appraisal showed land values essentially
unchanged from a 1986 appraisal, even though local real estate
Matthew J. Barrettis associateprofessorof law at Notre Dame
values had declined in the interim. Subsequently, the lead
Law School, Notre Dame, IN 46556; telephone (219) 631underwriter for the 1986 bonds notified Central that the collat8121.
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eral's value did not satisfy the 160 percent test and expressed
concern that the 1988 appraisal was unreliable. Central's own
investigation raised similar concerns.
As trustee for the 1986 bonds, Central requested that a different appraiser conduct an independent review of the updated
appraisal. After meetings with the Authority, the developer, and
others, Central agreed to defer the independent review until late
1988, at least six months after the Authority planned to sell the
1988 bonds. As a condition for Central's agreement, the developer agreed to pledge an additional $2 million in property to
secure the 1986 bonds. However, neither the Authority nor the
developer actually pledged any additional property as security
for the 1988 bonds, which the Authority sold as scheduled in
June 1988 without a new appraisal of the collateral. The
Authority later refused to complete the promised independent
review and, ultimately, defaulted on the 1988 bonds.
In response to the default, Naber and First Interstate sued
Central Bank and others, alleging that the sale of the 1988
bonds violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Naber and First
Interstate alleged that Central knowingly or recklessly aided
and abetted the fraud by withdrawing its demand for an immediate independent review of the updated appraisal in the face of
its concerns about the appraisal's accuracy and by agreeing to
delay the review until after the Authority had sold the 1988
bonds.
In an unpublished order, the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado held that recklessness could not satisfy
the mental-state requirement for aiding and abetting liability
unless the alleged aider and abettor also had a duty to disclose
information. Because the district court could not find any genuine issue of material fact as to Central's knowledge or duty to
disclose, the court granted Central's motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that a plaintiff could establish aiding and
abetting liability based on recklessness even though the alleged
aider and abettor had no duty to disclose, so long as the defendant's "affirmative action" assisted the primary violation. 969
F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court granted Central's petition for a writ of
certiorari on the question of whether recklessness satisfies the
mental-state requirement to impose civil liability for aiding and
abetting, even though the alleged aider and abettor has not
breached a duty to disclose or act. In addition, the Court directed the parties to brief and argue whether there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Implied Cause of Action
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit manipulative or
deceptive devices or contrivances that operate to mislead
investors in connection with the purchase or sale of any security through the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, the mails, or any national securities exchange.
Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5, however, create an
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express private right of action for violations. In this context, a
private right of action means that a private, nongovernmental
party can file a lawsuit alleging violations of Section 10(b) or
Rule lOb-5.
Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the lower federal courts have concluded that Section 10(b) allows a private right of action by
implication, reasoning, in part, that such private remedies reinforce federal statutory duties. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Musick, Peeler & Garrett v.
Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2088 (1993).
In 1971, the Supreme Court seemed to acquiesce in the private right of action for primary violations of Section 10(b).
Superintendentof Ins. v. Bankers Life & CasualtyCo., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 577-79 n.19 (1979). Twelve years later, the Supreme
Court left no doubt, observing that "[t]he existence of this
implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983).
In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a private
cause of action exists for aiding and abetting violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. In two previous cases, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976), and Herman
& MacLean, 459 U.S. at 379 n.5, the Court reserved the question of whether the statute and rule impose civil liability for aiding and abetting and also reserved the question of the elements
necessary to establish such liability.
At least since Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), and 286 F. Supp. 702 (1968),
affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970), the lower federal courts have unanimously concluded
that there is a private right of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Interestingly, Central did not raise this issue in the lower
courts or in its petition for a writ of certiorari because the Tenth
Circuit, like the other courts of appeals that have considered the
question, had previously recognized a private right of action for
aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
However, several lower courts have questioned and criticized
the creation of an implied private right of action in the aiding
and abetting context. Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., 959 F.2d
521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d
1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990). In granting Central's petition
for a writ of certiorari on the question of recklessness, the
Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and argue whether
there is an implied private right of action for aiding and abetting
violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
As a practical matter, the private right of action for aiding
and abetting recognized by the lower federal courts has enabled
investors to recover from various professionals and business
entities that have rendered services in connection with transactions involving securities fraud. These professionals and business entities - accountants, lawyers, appraisers, geologists,
engineers, actuaries, banks and rating agencies - often are
instrumental to securities transactions. But, while important,
PREVIEW

they do not actually buy and sell securities and usually do not
have a fiduciary relationship with those people who do.
Without aiding and abetting liability, investors might not be
able to recover losses in securities fraud cases from these
ancillary, but necessary, actors in securities transactions. In
essence, the issue in this case becomes whether the implied
private right of action applies only to defendants that engage
in manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent acts or goes farther
to reach defendants that assist others, whether through
action or inaction, in such conduct.
Central argues that the implied private right of action for
aiding and abetting conflicts with the language in Section
10(b) which proscribes only manipulative or deceptive conduct. Central also argues that the courts that have recognized
a private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have improperly applied tort
law concepts to securities law. Central asserts that in recent
years the Supreme Court has rejected application of general
tort law principles to create implied private rights of action
under the federal securities laws.
In contrast, First Interstate and Naber argue that neither
Section 10(b) nor Rule lOb-5 make any distinction between
primary violations and secondary, i.e., aiding and abetting,
violations of the statute or the rule. In their opinion, the
comprehensive language in Section 10(b) that "[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly," to engage in
the prohibited conduct underscores that the statute applies to
a broad class of defendants. They also argue that since the
prohibitions in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have given rise
to criminal aiding and abetting liability, the Supreme Court
should not interpret the provisions to immunize aiders and
abettors from civil liability.
Recklessness
If the Supreme Court concludes that Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 provide an implied private right of action for
aiding and abetting violations, the Court must determine
whether recklessness satisfies the mental-state requirement
which the lower courts have adopted as a prerequisite for
imposing aiding and abetting liability.
Lower courts agree that a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant possessed scienter, i.e., "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst,
425 U.S. at 194 n.12. On this element, a majority of lower
courts have concluded that recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement for aiding and abetting violations of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Relying in large part upon Levine v. Diamanthuset,Inc.,
950 F.2d 1478, 1483-85 (9th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit in
this case held that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement even though the alleged aider and abettor has not
breached a duty to disclose or act, if that person has taken
"affirmative action" that assists the primary violation of
these provisions. 969 F.2d at 902-03. However, the Tenth
Circuit's holding conflicts with decisions in the Second,
Issue No. 3

Fourth, and Eighth Circuits which have held that recklessness does not establish scienter unless the alleged aider and
abettor also breached a duty. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819,
824 (2d Cir. 1990); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); Camp
v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 462 (8th Cir. 1991).
Other courts of appeals use different tests. The Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted a "sliding scale" approach
under which the requisite degree of scienter varies depending upon whether the alleged aider and abettor breached a
duty to disclose and upon the nature of the defendant's conduct. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95-97 (5th Cir.
1975); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009-11
( lIth Cir. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit imposes the most restrictive test, requiring, at a minimum, that the alleged aider and abettor (1) commit
a "manipulative or deceptive" act which Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 prohibit and (2) satisfy the same scienter requirement
necessary for primary liability. Robin v. Arthur Young & Co.,
915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923
(1991). On the issue of scienter, this case enables the Court to
reconcile these conflicting views.
The standard used to establish scienter can be critical in
determining civil liability for aiding and abetting. As a general rule, a recklessness standard is easier for a plaintiff to
prove than a conscious-intent standard.
Central contends that the operative language in Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 indicates that the provisions prohibit
only conduct committed with actual knowledge of the securities fraud. Central also asserts that the recklessness standard creates uncertainty because it borders on negligence
which, the Supreme Court has held, cannot establish scienter for a primary violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
First Interstate and Naber argue that a recklessness standard operates to discourage deliberate ignorance, especially
in cases in which the defendant has affirmatively acted to
assist the primary violation. Moreover, because the victims
of fraud could recover tort damages for reckless conduct
when Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Congress designed the federal securities laws to
offer more protection to investors, they argue that a recklessness standard for aiding and abetting liability advances
Congressional intent.
If the Supreme Court determines that recklessness does
not establish scienter for aiding and abetting liability, the
Court need not reach the issue of whether recklessness
would suffice to establish the requisite scienter for a primary violation under Section 10(b) or Rule lOb-5. On two previous occasions, the Court has reserved that question. Aaron
v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5
(1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. If the Court
holds that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting liability, its holding may imply that
recklessness would suffice to establish a primary violation.
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Unlawful Arrest, Damages, and Technical Defenses
Since the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Payton v. New York, a person cannot be arrested at home without a warrant
unless police enter with consent or in hot pursuit. A person arrested in violation of this rule can sue for damages. In this
case, police arrested Charles Elder after ordering him out of his home. Courts in some cases have held that this type of
arrest also violates the Payton rule. Elder sued but lost because he did not raise these cases in the trial court. Now the
Court is asked to decide if Elder's lapse bars recovery.
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Farmer v. Brennan

Prisoner Assault and Prison Responsibility
Dee Farmer, a federal prisoner and also a pre-operative transsexual with a feminine appearance, was transferred for
disciplinary reasons to a maximum security prison and placed in the prison's general male population. Within two weeks,
Farmer was raped. Farmer then sued prison officials, claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk of
sexual assault. Farmer lost because the lower courts found that the officials did not have actual knowledge of any danger to
Farmer. Now the Court is asked to determine if deliberate indifference means disregarding an obvious risk or only a risk
actually known.
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Punishing Probation Violations: 2 Months in Prison or 20?
A person whose probation is revoked for a drug offense must be given a sentence equal to one third of his of her original
sentence. In this case, the Court will decide whether the term original sentence refers to the length of the initial
probationary sentence or to the length of the prison sentence which could have been imposed in lieu of probation. For
Ralph Stuart Granderson the answer means the difference between a two-month or a 20-month prison sentence.
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